Haroun Zubairu: Sierra Leone Telegraph: 16 September 2026:
My fellow Sierra Leoneans, there is now another major development in the controversy surrounding the Constitutional Amendment Bill. President Julius Maada Bio has referred a petition concerning the Bill to the Supreme Court, relying on Section 122 subsection 1 of the 1991 Constitution.
The question many people are asking is simple: Is the President constitutionally allowed to do this? And does this referral solve the controversy surrounding the passage of the Bill?
Let us separate the issues.
First, Section 122 subsection 1 does give the President authority, in certain circumstances, to refer a petition on which he is required to make a final decision to the Supreme Court for a judicial opinion.
So, on the face of the Constitution, I do not believe it is correct to simply say that President Bio has no authority whatsoever to approach the Supreme Court.
There is a legitimate constitutional basis for a referral. But that is only the beginning of the discussion. The bigger question is whether Section 122 allows the President to delay action on a Bill beyond the constitutional framework established under Section 106.
Section 106 provides the process for presidential assent and says that where the President refuses to sign a Bill, he must return it to Parliament within fourteen days and explain his reasons.
Section 122 gives the President the power of referral. But Section 122 does not expressly say that referring a petition to the Supreme Court automatically suspends or extends the constitutional timeline under Section 106.
That is an important question the Supreme Court may now have to resolve. But Sierra Leoneans should understand something else:
The President’s referral does not erase what happened in Parliament. The Supreme Court still has to determine whether Parliament itself complied with the Constitution when passing the amendment.
And this brings us back to Sections 91 and 108. Section 91 deals with ordinary decisions of Parliament. Generally, those decisions are determined by members present and voting. But Section 91 begins with very important words: “Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution.”
And Section 108 provides otherwise when Parliament is attempting to amend the Constitution. Section 108 subsection 2 requires that a constitutional amendment Bill receive not less than two-thirds of the Members of Parliament at the required stages.
Notice the difference.
Section 91 talks about members present and voting. Section 108 does not say two-thirds of those present. It says two-thirds of the Members of Parliament. And Parliament’s own Standing Orders make the position even clearer. Standing Order 44 refers to the requirement as two-thirds of all the Members of the House.
Therefore, this is not simply an APC versus SLPP argument. It is a constitutional question. If the Constitution requires two-thirds of the entire valid membership of Parliament, then the Court must determine whether that threshold was actually achieved.
If it was achieved, let the evidence demonstrate it. If it was not achieved, then we must ask a very serious question: Can a constitutional amendment that failed to obtain the constitutionally required votes become valid simply because it was subsequently sent to the President?
In my view, the answer should be no. Presidential assent cannot manufacture missing parliamentary votes. The President cannot cure a constitutional defect that occurred before the Bill reached his desk.
And there may be another important issue. Section 108 subsection 3 protects certain entrenched provisions of the Constitution. If the final Constitutional Amendment Bill actually changes provisions such as Sections 85 or 87, then we must determine whether those changes trigger the referendum requirement contained in Section 108.
I want to be careful here. We need to see the exact final version of the Bill passed by Parliament. But if entrenched provisions remain in that final Bill, then the referendum question becomes extremely important.
So where does this leave Sierra Leone?
The Supreme Court now has an enormous responsibility. This should not be treated as a victory for the government. It should not be treated as a victory for the opposition either. This is about protecting the Constitution.
The Court must answer the legal questions independently: Did Parliament obtain the votes required by Section 108?
Can Section 91’s present-and-voting rule override the special constitutional amendment procedure in Section 108?
Does the President’s Section 122 referral affect the fourteen-day framework under Section 106?
And if entrenched provisions were amended, was a referendum constitutionally required?
Those are the questions. For me, the most important principle is simple: Nobody—not the President, not the Speaker, not Parliament, not APC, and not SLPP—is above the Constitution.
If we want constitutional reform, let us reform the Constitution. But let us do it constitutionally. Because once we start changing the supreme law of Sierra Leone by ignoring the procedures contained inside that same Constitution, we create a dangerous precedent for every government that comes after this one.
This case is now bigger than one Bill. It is bigger than one political party. It is about whether the constitutional safeguards created to protect our democracy actually mean what they say.
And now, the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone has an opportunity to tell the nation exactly what those words mean.
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