Mohammed Kroma Esq: Siera Leone Telegraph: 24 April 2026:
The debate over whether Parliament can establish a Standing Committee on Electoral Matters has produced more heat than light. Brima Sannoh’s analysis in Cocorioko yesterday was fair-minded — but fairness without precision leaves the constitutional question unanswered.
What Section 32(11) says — and what it does not
Section 32(11) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone states that the Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone (ECSL) shall not be subject to the control or direction of any person or authority in the exercise of its functions.
That provision protects operational independence. It means no minister, no party, no court can tell the ECSL how to count votes, manage results, or run an election. It does not — and cannot — mean that a constitutionally created public institution is exempt from parliamentary accountability.
These are two entirely different things. Control is interference.
Oversight is accountability. Conflating them is not a constitutional argument. It is a political shield dressed in constitutional language.
Parliament’s Oversight Mandate Is Also Constitutional
Sections 93 and 119 of the same Constitution vest Parliament with supervisory authority over public institutions and public funds. The ECSL is funded by the public purse.
Its commissioners are appointed through a process the Agreement for National Unity (ANU) has identified as requiring reform. Its conduct directly determines whether Sierra Leone’s elections are credible.
Parliament’s oversight of that institution is not a favour. It is a constitutional duty.
A Standing Committee on Electoral Matters would not tell the ECSL how to conduct elections. It would ensure that the Commission operates transparently, that its budget is accounted for, and that its appointment process meets the standards the ANU has already mandated. That is oversight. It is lawful. It is necessary.
The SLPP’s Position Is Legally Indefensible
Opposition to the Standing Committee on the basis of Section 32(11) misreads the provision entirely. No serious constitutional scholar — in Sierra Leone or anywhere in the Commonwealth — would argue that parliamentary oversight committees violate the independence of the bodies they oversee.
Every independent commission in every functioning democracy operates under some form of parliamentary accountability without losing its independence.
The SLPP knows this. Which means their invocation of Section 32(11) is not a constitutional position. It is a political one.
The International Guarantors Got It Right
The International Moral Guarantors’ recommendation for a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Electoral Matters is constitutionally sound, politically necessary, and entirely consistent with the ANU framework Sierra Leone’s political leadership signed in October 2023.
The time for constitutional notes of caution has passed. The time for compliance has arrived.
The rule of law is the rule of law.
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